T20 Profile Strength was Matthew Hayden's strength - both mental and physical. It enabled him to shrug off years of carping that he was technically too limited for Test cricket because of the way he played around his front pad, and it enabled him to touch rarefied heights of batsmanship. Before his maiden first-class innings, he asked if anyone had made on debut, then went out and hit The runs rarely abated over the next 17 years.
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is adopting new rules to address three issues: The rules are designed to promote the full and fair disclosure of information by issuers, and to clarify and enhance existing prohibitions against insider trading. The new rules and amendments will take effect October 23, The Securities and Exchange Commission today is adopting new rules: Regulation FD, 1 Rule 10b, 2 and Rule 10b Executive Summary We are adopting new rules and amendments to address the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information by issuers and to clarify two issues under the law of insider trading.
In response to the comments we received on the proposal, we have made several modifications, as discussed below, in the final rules. Regulation FD Fair Disclosure is a new issuer disclosure rule that addresses selective disclosure. The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons in general, securities market professionals and holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the informationit must make public disclosure of that information.
The timing of the required public disclosure depends on whether the selective disclosure was intentional or non-intentional; for an intentional selective disclosure, the issuer must make public disclosure simultaneously; for a non-intentional disclosure, the issuer must make public disclosure promptly.
Under the regulation, the required public disclosure may be made by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by another method or combination of methods that is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.
Rule 10b addresses the issue of when insider trading liability arises in connection with a trader's "use" or "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information. This rule provides that a person trades "on the basis of" material nonpublic information when the person purchases or sells securities while aware of the information.
However, the rule also sets forth several affirmative defenses, which we have modified in response to comments, to permit persons to trade in certain circumstances where it is clear that the information was not a factor in the decision to trade.
Rule 10b addresses the issue of when a breach of a family or other non-business relationship may give rise to liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading.
The rule sets forth three non-exclusive bases for determining that a duty of trust or confidence was owed by a person receiving information, and will provide greater certainty and clarity on this unsettled issue.
Background As discussed in the Proposing Release, 5 we have become increasingly concerned about the selective disclosure of material information by issuers.
As reflected in recent publicized reports, many issuers are disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same information to the general public.
Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark.
We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets. Investors who see a security's price change dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for that move rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.
Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to ordinary "tipping" and insider trading. In both cases, a privileged few gain an informational edge -- and the ability to use that edge to profit -- from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or diligence.
Likewise, selective disclosure has an adverse impact on market integrity that is similar to the adverse impact from illegal insider trading: Yet, as a result of judicial interpretations, tipping and insider trading can be severely punished under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, whereas the status of issuer selective disclosure has been considerably less clear.
As noted in the Proposing Release, in the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to report favorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued access to selectively disclosed information.
We are concerned, in this regard, with reports that analysts who publish negative views of an issuer are sometimes excluded by that issuer from calls and meetings to which other analysts are invited.
Whereas issuers once may have had to rely on analysts to serve as information intermediaries, issuers now can use a variety of methods to communicate directly with the market. In addition to press releases, these methods include, among others, Internet webcasting and teleconferencing.
Accordingly, technological limitations no longer provide an excuse for abiding the threats to market integrity that selective disclosure represents. To address the problem of selective disclosure, we proposed Regulation FD.
It targets the practice by establishing new requirements for full and fair disclosure by public companies. Breadth of Comment on the Proposal The Proposing Release prompted an outpouring of public comment -- nearly 6, comment letters.
Individual investors expressed frustration with the practice of selective disclosure, believing that it places them at a severe disadvantage in the market. Several cited personal experiences in which they believed they had been disadvantaged by the practice. Other comments suggested that today's self-directed, online investors do not expect to rely exclusively on research and analysis performed by professionals, as was more common in the past.
With advances in information technology, most notably the Internet, information can be communicated to shareholders directly and in real time, without the intervention of an intermediary. This online revolution has created a greater demand, expectation, and need for direct delivery of market information.
As many individual commenters noted, under this paradigm, analysts still provide value for investors by using their education, judgment, and expertise to analyze information.
On the other hand, investors are rightly concerned with the use of information gatekeepers who merely repeat information that has been selectively disclosed to them.
Noting that analysts predominantly issue "buy" recommendations on covered issuers, investors also made the point that current selective disclosure practices may create conflicts of interest; analysts have an incentive not to make negative statements about an issuer if they fear losing their access to selectively disclosed information.
Thus, these commenters suggested that a rule against selective disclosure could lead to more objective and accurate analysis and recommendations from securities analysts.1.
Introduction. In this paper, we address the question: how susceptible are jobs to computerisation? Doing so, we build on the existing literature in two ways. Final Rule: Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 17 CFR Parts and [Release Nos.
; ; ; IC; IA; FR;. The economy of India is a developing mixed economy. It is the world's sixth-largest economy by nominal GDP and the third-largest by purchasing power parity (PPP).
The country ranks th in per capita GDP (nominal) with $2, and nd in per capita GDP (PPP) with $7, as of After the economic liberalisation, India achieved % average GDP growth annually.
Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 17 CFR Parts , , and Release Nos. , , IC, File No. S En los siguientes enlaces puede encontrar información de importancia para el desarrollo del curso, así como material de apoyo para comprender mejor la temática de esta asignatura.
Learn econ with free interactive flashcards. Choose from different sets of econ flashcards on Quizlet.